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ESSAY
The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law
Stewart Jay*
A perennial issue is the relationship of international law to the do-
mestic law of the United States. The question appears in various con-
texts, but in each the central problem is determining whether the body
of customary international law is binding on the national and state gov-
ernments. Discussions about this subject inevitably lead to considera-
tion of separation of powers at the national level. If the United States
may depart from international law, which branch of government has the
power to do so? If one branch transgresses international law, is this
action binding on the others?' For example, a recent case examined the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., Georgetown University, 1973; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1976.
The grand jury charges referred to in this Essay were obtained from the Documentary History
Project, Supreme Court of the United States, through the generous assistance of its Director,
Maeva Marcus. These charges eventually will be published in a future volume of the Project's
series, The Documentary History of the Supreme Court 1789-1800.
Thanks to Joan Fitzpatrick, Wythe Holt, Maeva Marcus, Deborah Perluss, Kathryn Preyer,
and Louis Wolcher for reading and commenting on a draft of this Essay.
1. A major difference exists between the question of whether customary international law is
binding on the several branches of the United States government based on constitutional com-
mand and the question of whether the United States should suffer consequences in the interna-
tional community for violations of customary international law. For example, under current
constitutional interpretations, the President arguably has the authority to violate customary inter-
national law. These actions by the President, however, may expose the country to adverse conse-
quences in the international arena, such as giving another country just cause to suspend treaty
obligations or to use military force against the United States. See Henkin, International Law as
Law in the United States, 82 MtcH. L. REv. 1555, 1567-69 (1984). This Essay deals for the most
part with the first question. As will be discussed, however, assertions by persons in the eighteenth
century that the law of nations was "the law of the United States" may have been made with
regard to the second question.
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executive's authority to detain aliens in violation of international law,
and thus implicitly raised the issue of the judiciary's authority to order
the executive to conform to international norms.
Considering the importance of the basic issues involved, it is not
surprising that a small industry of scholarship has grown around them,
with each generation of scholars revisiting the territory. Most of these
works make an excursion into the legal history of the eighteenth cen-
tury, presumably with the idea that this background will help explain
the place that international law was intended to occupy under the Con-
stitution.4 Those who sympathize with imposing at least some custom-
ary international legal constraints on the United States have found this
early history to be a particularly fruitful source of authority. A large
number of declarations can be assembled from leading figures of that
era to the effect that the law of nations was a part of American law and
in important respects binding on our government. For others who are
skeptical of placing limits on the domestic law of the United States
through application of customary international law, the task has been
to explain away the significance of this history.
Despite the forays into history that have been attempted on this
subject, one is left nevertheless with the impression that there is lack of
correlation between the historical studies and current concerns about
American governmental actions. Although scholars continue to report
new sources to demonstrate the importance of the law of nations to
eighteenth-century American law, for the most part they merely sub-
2. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 901-04 (N.D. Ga. 1985), reviewed sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the executive may
disregard international law in service of domestic policy).
3. The most recent contribution appears in the Vanderbilt Law Review. See Weisburd, The
Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1988). A sampling of the litera-
ture includes: 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 n.1 (1965) (collecting older sources); Char-
ney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to Violate Customary
International Law, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986); D'Amato, The President and International Law:
A Missing Dimension, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 375 (1987); Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952) [hereinafter Dickinson, Law of
Nations]; Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. IN'L L. 239
(1932) [hereinafter Dickinson, Changing Concepts]; Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is
Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. Rpv.
321 (1986); Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Stat-
utes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984); Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. lRv.
853 (1987); Henkin, supra note 1; Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Execut-
ing" Custom, 81 AM. J. INTL L. 371 (1987); Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); Paust, The President Is Bound by Interna-
tional Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987); Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International
Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. INr'L L. 280 (1932).
4. The best recent effort is Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between
Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985).
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stantiate better what has long been known. Unfortunately, legal com-
mentators have made little effort to consider eighteenth-century
pronouncements on the law of nations in the historical context that
produced the Constitution and formed the setting for American foreign
policy decisions under the new government.
The purpose of this Essay is to demonstrate the way in which the
law of nations was treated in the constitutional politics of the late
eighteenth century. It is not meant to be an exhaustive rendition of
events in relation to the law of nations. But even an overview of some of
the major controversies establishes that many of the statements re-
corded from that period about international law must be interpreted in
light of America's status in the world. America was, after all, a weak
power with an unproven government, operating in a world in which
warfare was a common form of dispute resolution and a principal ele-
ment of the international aspirations motivating many nations. While
the world still emphasizes violence as a foreign policy tool, America's
role now is completely unlike the one that it consciously sought to as-
sume in its infancy. As a part of this transformation, American Presi-
dents have become accustomed to asserting vigorously the executive's
prerogatives in foreign relations.
In addition to exploring the international events that confronted
the early Republic, we need to account for the jurisprudential theories
underlying the eighteenth-century Anglo-American view of the rele-
vance of the law of nations to domestic law. Of course, this is not ex-
actly fresh territory for scholarship. Much of the existing commentary,
however, interprets key provisions of the Constitution without consider-
ing either historical purpose or legal context. With distressing regularity
legal scholars assume that certain words meant the same in the eigh-
teenth century as they do today, or that persons two hundred years ago
would construe a constitution in the way we would. For example, the
syntax and general structure of the Constitution may imply meanings
to a modern reader that do not reflect the intentions of the document's
authors. Most importantly, we should bear in mind that the language of
the Constitution was intended to create a government to deal with the
affairs of a particular eighteenth-century society, one that scarcely re-
sembles our own.
I. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND DOMESTIC LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
JURISPRUDENCE
Writers in the eighteenth century did not always use the term "law
of nations" to describe the same subject matter, nor did certain writers
use the expression consistently. In its broadest usage, the law of nations
comprised the law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts of
1989]
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laws, as well as the law governing the relations between states. At
times writers distinguished between the law of nations and the law
merchant,' but the law of nations always was understood to encompass
what Justice James Iredell referred to as the law governing "controver-
sies between nation and nation."'7 These differences in terminology
probably were not significant inasmuch as it was commonly recognized
that there was a body of general law that "existed by common practice
and consent among a number of sovereigns."8 This diverse collection of
law encompassed commercial disputes between individuals, private dis-
putes in admiralty, criminal offenses, and a host of issues that arose
under what we now term public international law. In theory, or at least
in aspiration, this general law was uniform throughout the civilized
world.9 A court applying the law of nations was "in effect, a court of all
the nations of the world."' 0
In the eighteenth century a consensus existed that the law of na-
tions rested in large measure on natural law. As Emmerich de Vattel
contended, and Americans repeated, "the law of Nations is originally
no other than the law of Nature applied to Nations."1 Jurists fre-
5. See Dickinson, Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 26-34. On the law of conflicts of laws as
part of the law of nations, see Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHL L.
REV. 775, 805 (1955).
6. See, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Wilson, J.).
Although Justice Wilson referred to the law merchant as if it were separate from the law of na-
tions, he cited Blackstone describing it as "a branch of the law of nations." Id. (citing 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (1769)[hereinafter 4 W. BLACKSTONE]). St.
George Tucker's 1803 American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries also distinguished the "gen-
eral law merchant" from the "general law of nations." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 421 n.8 (S.
Tucker ed. 1803) [hereinafter 1 W. BLACKSTONE].
7. See Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794) [herein-
after South Carolina Charge], in GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia 1794) [hereinafter
U.S. GAZETTE].
8. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984); see Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1263-67 (1985).
9. This conclusion even applied to commercial issues. See J. SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND
TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 352 (Boston 1801).
10. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 91 (1795) (Iredell, J.) The Court noted: "[Prize
cases are] determined by the law of nations. A prize court is, in effect, a court of all the nations in
the world, because all persons, in every part of the world, are concluded by its sentences." Id.; see
The Walsingham Packet (1799), reprinted in 2 REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY 78, 82 (G. Minot ed. 1853) [hereinafter ADMIRALTY CASES]; The Maria
(1799), reprinted in 1 ADMIRALTY CASES, supra, at 340, 350; see also Sprout, supra note 3, at 293.
11. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS at lvi (J. Chitty ed. 1863) (emphasis in original) (the
original edition was published in 1758). James Wilson followed Vattel closely in telling a grand
jury: "The law of nations has its foundation in the principles of natural law, applied to states; and
in voluntary institutions, arising from custom or convention." Charge to the Grand Jury for the
District of Virginia 16 (May 23, 1791) (A. Davis ed. 1791) [hereinafter Virginia Charge 1791], in 2
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 813 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) [hereinafter WORKS OF JAMES WILSON].
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quently claimed that the law of nations derived from divine law. Chief
Justice John Jay instructed a grand jury in 1793: "It may be asked who
made the laws of nations? The answer is he from whose will proceed all
moral obligations, and which will is made known to us by reason or by
revelation. '12 Others described the doctrines of the law of nations as
deriving from human reason. Justice Iredell told a grand jury that "the
only way to ascertain the duties which one nation owes to another, is to
enquire what reason dictates, that attribute which the Almighty has be-
stowed upon all mankind for the ultimate guide and director of their
conduct."13 These were fairly loose, albeit widely accepted expressions,
and the reliance on higher law leaves many modern observers with the
impression that there was great uncertainty in all law during the Revo-
lutionary era.14 But the vagueness we may find inherent in these inexact
formulations did not prevent writers from describing the law of nations
as a system of rules capable of rational explication.
To an eighteenth-century lawyer, a major part of the law of nations
consisted of "[c]ertain maxims and customs, consecrated by long use,
and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as
a kind of law." 5 In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers
and judges of that era relied heavily on continental treatise writers,
Vattel being the most often consulted by Americans. An essential part
of a sound legal education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among others.' 6 Quotations from these
sources appeared not only in briefs and opinions, but also in discussions
of critical foreign policy matters by the President's Cabinet and in the
popular press. Implicit in this widespread usage was acceptance of the
validity of the law of nations as knowable doctrine. But some even went
further in their praise. Justice Iredell spoke in this manner to a grand
jury in 1794:
The Law of Nations, by which alone all controversies between nation and nation
12. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (May 22, 1793) [hereinafter Vir-
ginia Charge 1793], in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 480 (H. Johnston
ed. 1891) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JOHN JAY] (emphasis in original). Justice Wilson wrote that "the
law of nations, as well as the law of nature, is of origin divine." 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra
note 11, at 149.
13. South Carolina Charge, supra note 7, in U.S. GAZETTE, supra note 7.
14. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 291-305 (1969).
15. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 11, at lxv (emphasis in original). On the various approaches to
the law of nations, see Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 3; and Reeves, The Influence of
the Law of Nature upon International Law in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547 (1909).
16. See Dickinson, Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 35. Lord Mansfield said in the oft cited
case of Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 1481, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937 (K.B. 1764), that "the law of
nations was to be collected from the practice of different nations and [also from] the authority of
Grotius, Barbeyrac, Bynkershoek, Wiquefort [and others,] there being no English writer of emi-
nence, upon the subject." Id. at 1481, 97 Eng. Rep. at 938.
8231989]
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can be determined, has been cultivated with extraordinary success. In its main
principles, as stated by many able writers all civilized nations concur.... Within
these few years this law has not only been stated with peculiar accuracy and con-
ciseness, but all its principles have been traced to their sources with a power of
reasoning which has commanded universal assent. .... 17
Viewed from a modern vantage point, the reliance on treatise writ-
ers may be explained partially by the unavailability of other authority,
such as published case reports or diplomatic records.18 Nevertheless, in
this prepositivist era the treatise writers were respected for their use of
natural reasoning to discover the true principles of the law of nations.
These were the same sources who had an established place in the intel-
lectual foundation of the Revolution's ideology of natural rights. As rev-
olutionaries, Americans quoted these authorities in the course of
demanding respect for natural rights that were perceived as grounded
in a body of law existing independently of positive enactment."9 The
law of nations, described as a system of rights based on natural reason-
ing, fit well with Enlightenment rationalism. In the same grand jury
charge just noted, Iredell remarked that "[w]e have the happiness to
live in an age when human knowledge in all its branches has been car-
ried to a great perfection."20 With regard to the law of nations, it had
been expounded and accepted "with a spirit of freedom and enlarged
liberality of mind entirely suited to the high improvements the present
age has made in all kinds of political reasoning."'"
Educated Americans of this period were familiar with Blackstone's
position that "the law of nations . . . is here adopted in it's full extent
by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. '22
American revolutionaries held as a fundamental article of faith that the
colonists were entitled to the protection of the common law.23 Notwith-
17. South Carolina Charge, supra note 7, in US. GAZETTE, supra note 7.
18. See Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 3, at 241-42, 259.
19. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-27 (1967); G.
WOOD, supra note 14, at 9, 291-305; Lobel, supra note 4, at 1079-80; Sherry, The Intellectual
Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyer's Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 323, 327 (1988).
20. South Carolina Charge, supra note 7, in U.S. GAZETTE, supra note 7.
21. Id.
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 67 (eighteenth-century grammatical conventions are
not corrected in text); see Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 1481, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764)
(Mansfield, J.) (stating that "'[t]he law of nations, in its full extent was part of the law of Eng-
land' "). Judge Mansfield purported to be quoting from Barbuit's Case, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (Ch.
1737) (Talbot, L.C.). On these cases, see Sprout, supra note 3, at 282-84.
23. See J. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTEM CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED
POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPmE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 24-28 (1986); see, e.g.,
Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress (1774), in READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYS-
TEM OF THE COMMON LAW 309 (R. Pound & T. Plucknett 3d ed. 1927) (stating that "the respective
colonies are entitled to the common law of England").
824 [Vol. 42:819
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standing the controversy that would erupt in the 1790s over the extent
to which the common law formed the basis for the law of the national
government, writers generally asserted that the law of nations was part
of the law of the new American states and their national government.
The Continental Congress resolved that it was the organ for exer-
cising the powers of war for the United States, and that accordingly it
was charged with "executing" the relevant law of nations. In particular
this meant that American courts would decide prize cases during the
Revolution according to the law of nations.24 During the Confederation
period there was acute awareness among national leaders of the obliga-
tions imposed by the law of nations. One of the main reasons for con-
vening the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 was the transgression of
that law by various states.25 The failure of states to enforce debts owed
to foreigners (British creditors in particular) was a special concern be-
cause the law of nations at that time could be interpreted to allow a
creditor nation to resort to war for satisfaction.
26
In the early years of the American Republic, federal judges, leading
political figures, and commentators commonly stated that the law of
nations was part of the law of the United States. Chief Justice Jay in-
formed a grand jury on circuit in 1790 that "[w]e had become a na-
tion-as such, we were responsible to others for the observance of the
Laws of Nations. '27 Jay specifically instructed that the law of nations
was "part of the laws of this, and of every other civilized nation. ' 28 Dur-
ing a charge in 1794, Justice Iredell explained to another grand jury:
The Common Law of England, from which our own is derived, fully recognizes the
principles of the Law of Nations, and applies them in all cases falling under its
jurisdiction, where the nature of the subject requires it .... In whatever manner
24. In 1779 the Continental Congress resolved to insist on strict compliance with the law of
nations when determining the legality of captures on the high seas. See 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS 635 (W. Ford ed. 1909); see also Reeves, supra note 15, at 556-57.
25. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19, 24-25 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) [hereinafter M. Farrand]. Governor Edmund Randolph argued that national authority
was needed to prevent states from infringing the law of nations, which could produce war. He cited
as examples the failure to honor treaties and the general absence of laws to protect the rights of
foreign ambassadors. Id.
26. See F. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 45 (1973).
27. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 4, 1790) [hereinafter New
York Charge], in NEW HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Portsmouth 1790) [hereinafter N.H. GAZETTE] (em-
phasis in original). Jay made a similar statement in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474
(1793).
28. New York Charge, supra note 27, in N.H. GAzETrE, supra note 27; see also Virginia
Charge 1793, supra note 12 (Jay, Cir. J.), in 3 PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 12, at 479 (stating
that "[t]he Constitution, the statutes of Congress, the laws of nations, and treaties constitutionally
made compose the laws of the United States").
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the Law of Nations is violated, it is a subject of national, not personal complaint.2'
Justice Wilson declared in a 1796 case that "[w]hen the United
States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law
of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement."30 Earlier, Wil-
son had informed a grand jury that neutrality violations by American
citizens constituted an indictable offense against the law of nations, de-
spite the lack of a federal statute making such conduct a crime s.3  The
neutrality cases of the 1790s, which we will return to later, reflect in a
series of opinions and grand jury charges the accepted view among lead-
ing Supreme Court and lower federal court judges that the laws of the
United States encompassed the law of nations.3 2
Alexander Hamilton wrote in his Pacificus papers of 1793 that the
law of nations was included within "the laws of the land. 3' As Camil-
lus he contended two years later that the United States was bound to
comply with the "customary law of Nations as established in Europe. '3 4
Writing in reply to Hamilton under the pseudonym Helvidius, James
Madison conceded that his adversary's point about the law of nations
was "a truth. '3 5 Both Attorneys General Edmund Randolph and
Charles Lee declared in opinions to secretaries of state in the 1790s that
the law of nations was part of the law of the land. Randolph specifically
noted that this conclusion was unaffected by the fact that the law of
nations was "not specially adopted by the Constitution or any munici-
pal act."3 " William Rawle, who was one of the leading lawyers of the
29. South Carolina Charge, supra note 7, in U.S. GAZETTE, supra note 7. Justice Iredell made
a similar statement in Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795).
30. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) (emphasis in original).
-31. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Grand Jury
Charge of Wilson, Cir. J.).
32. See Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 1), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1040-53 (1985).
33. A. HAMILTON, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
34 (H. Syrett ed. 1969) [hereinafter PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON].
34. A. HAMILTON, To Defence No. XX (Oct. 23-24, 1795), in 19 PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON,
supra note 33, at 341-42 (H. Syrett ed. 1973). Hamilton explained:
The common law of England which was & is in force in each of these states adopts the law of
Nations, the positive equally with the natural, as a part of itself.... Ever since we have been
an Independent nation we have appealed to and acted upon the modern law of Nations as
understood in Europe. Various resolutions of Congress during our Revolution-the correspon-
dence of executive officers-the decisions of our Courts of Admiralty, all recognised this stan-
dard.. . Executive and legislative acts and the proceedings of our Courts under the present
government speak a similar language. The President's Proclamation of Neutrality refers ex-
pressly to the modern law of Nations. .-. . 'Tis indubitable that the customary law of Euro-
pean Nations is a part of the common law and by adoption that of the U[nited] States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Madison, Helvidius No. II, in THE LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUs 73 (J. Gideon ed.
1845) [hereinafter LETTERS].
36. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Attorney General Randolph); id. at 68 (1797) (Attorney
General Lee); cf. id. at 57 (1795) (Attorney General William Bradford).
[Vol. 42:819
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period as well as the United States Attorney in Philadelphia during
most of the 1790s, summarized the attitude when he wrote that "[t]he
law of nations forms a part of the common law of every civilized
country."117
Jurists of this era also typically recited that as to its obligatory ele-
ments the law of nations could not be violated by positive enactments.
"Whence, as this law is immutable," wrote Vattel, "and the obligations
that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither
make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their
own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of
it." ' George Nicholas claimed at the Virginia ratifying convention in
1788 that "the law of nations was permanent and general. It was supe-
rior to any act or law of any nation; it implied the consent of all, and
was mutually binding on all."3 9 Justice Iredell instructed a grand jury in
1794 that "[e]ven the Legislature cannot rightfully controul [the law of
nations], but if it passes any law on such subjects is bound by the dic-
tates of moral duty to the rest of the world in no instance to transgress
them."'40 Consistent with the English tradition, American legislation in
an area subject to the law of nations was said to be "declaratory of the
law of nations," '41 or to have "provided a particular manner of enforcing
it.,,M2
These statements encompassed not only unilateral actions by gov-
37. W. RAWLE, A ViEw OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 108 (Phila-
delphia 2d ed. 1829).
38. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 11, at lviii.
39. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 502 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter STATE CONVENTION DEBATES].
40. South Carolina Charge, supra note 7, in U.S. GAzETTE, supra note 7. Before a grand jury
in 1791, Justice Wilson maintained:
True it is, that, so far as the law of nations is voluntary or positive, it may be altered by the
municipal legislature of any state, in cases affecting only its own citizens. True it also is, that,
by a treaty, the voluntary or positive law of nations may be altered so far as the alteration
shall affect only the contracting parties. But equally true it is, that no state or states can, by
treaties or municipal laws, alter or abrogate the law of nations any further.
Virginia Charge 1791, supra note 11, at 16, in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 11, at 813-14
(emphasis in original).
41. Grand Jury Charge, in W. PATERSON, PATERSON PAPERS (n.p. circa 1795) (original in
Rutgers University Library).
42. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (Iredell, J.). For the similar English
tradition, see Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 3, at 254-55. Statutes incorporated the
law of nations by reference, meaning that their provisions were understandable only in light of pre-
existing law. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (stating that the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court in cases involving ambassadors and foreign ministers is to be exercised
"consistently with the law of nations"); id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77 (authorizing an alien to sue "for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"); An Act for the Punish-
ment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (1790) (making it a crime
to "assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any manner infract the law of nations, by offering vio-
lence to the person of an ambassador or other public minister").
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ernments, but also the inability of nations to alter by treaty what Vattel
termed the "necessary" laws of nations.4 3 Justice Wilson explained that
"[t]his they can no more do, than a citizen can, by his single determina-
tion, or two citizens can, by a private contract between them, alter or
abrogate the laws of the community, in which they reside."'44 During the
Virginia ratifying convention, Madison, Randolph, and others at-
tempted to deflate the Anti-Federalist argument that the federal gov-
ernment could attempt to relinquish by treaty navigation rights on the
Mississippi or otherwise to impair the country's territorial integrity;
they did so by contending that such actions would be void under the
law of nations.45 Writing in The Federalist No. 64, John Jay countered
a similar Anti-Federalist objection that the President and Senate might
conspire to form "corrupt" treaties, such as one in which "they and
their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with
the rest of the community."' 46 While doubting that this would be politi-
cally possible given the two-thirds approval requirement, he added that
"if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all
other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations. ' 47
The law of nations also fixed a natural right of states to insist on
respect for treaty obligations. As Vattel stated, treaties "conferred...
a real right to require the thing promised. . . . Nations, therefore, and
their conductors, ought inviolably to observe their promises and their
treaties. '48 Jay explained in The Federalist that the new national gov-
ernment would be powerless to alter treaties by legislation: "[A]s the
consent of both [nations making a treaty] was essential to their forma-
tion at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. '49
Justice Iredell wrote in a 1796 opinion that "a treaty, when executed
pursuant to full power, is valid and obligatory, in point of moral obliga-
tion, on all, as well on the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Depart-
ments . . . as on every individual of the nation . . . because it is a
promise in effect by the whole nation to another nation."50
43. See E. DE VATrTEL, supra note 11, at lvii-lviii.
44. Virginia Charge 1791, supra note 11, at 16, in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 11,
at 814.
45. See Lobel, supra note 4, at 1094-95.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 438 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
47. Id.
48. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 11, at 195-96.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 46, at 437.
50. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796) (Iredell, J.) (emphasis in original).
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II. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION
Given the importance of the law of nations to national affairs, the
Framers assumed as a matter of course that the federal government
should have the ability to dominate most of the decisionmaking related
to that law. Principally this result was accomplished by giving the fed-
eral government control over foreign relations, divided mainly between
the executive and the Congress, but with a prominent role for the fed-
eral courts. Nothing in this allocation implies that the political
branches had power to act contrary to the law of nations. Instead, the
persistent idea was to provide a national monopoly of authority in order
to assure respect for international obligations. 1
Notwithstanding this interest in the law of nations, there are no
recorded discussions among the Framers that are as candid as later ju-
dicial statements would be in describing the law of nations as part of
the "law of the United States" or the "law of the land." It was not from
sheer reluctance to employ the law of nations as a term in the Constitu-
tion, since article I expressly authorized Congress "[tlo define and pun-
ish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations. 5 2 Furthermore, the
specific grant of authority to Congress over "piracy" was intended to
give Congress the power to define a crime that otherwise the law of
nations would demarcate; 53 specifically, Congress could augment provi-
sions in the general law of nations regarding piracy that were "too
vague and deficient to be a rule. '54
Despite these gaps in the historical record, a significant portion of
the Framers' rationale with respect to constitutional authority and the
law of nations may be inferred. This section describes the relationship
that the Framers saw between the Constitution and the law of nations.
As will become apparent in the concluding section of this Essay, how-
ever, the various statements about the law of nations already quoted
from figures in the 1790s were meant to address matters quite different
from the issues that concerned the Framers.
51. See F. MARKS, supra note 26, at 142-43; W. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS 59-60 (1981).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 10.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 46, at 281 (J. Madison) (asserting that "[tihe defini-
tion of piracies might perhaps without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legis-
lative definition of them, is found in most municipal codes"); see Sprout, supra note 3, at 282.
54. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 25, at 615 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). Morris was responding
to James Wilson's argument that "[tlo pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the
authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance. [sic] that
would make us ridiculous." Id. (Mr. Wilson) (emphasis in original); see Lobel, supra note 4, at
1093.
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A. The Federal Courts and the Law of Nations
Most of the specific discussions in Philadelphia about the law of
nations dealt with judicial competence. George Mason wrote to a corre-
spondent at the beginning of the Convention that with regard to the
courts "[t]he most prevalent idea [was] to establish ... a judiciary sys-
tem with cognizance of all such matters as depend upon the law of na-
tions, and such other objects as the local courts of justice may be
inadequate to."55 In The Federalist No. 3, Jay defended federal court
jurisdiction over the law of nations and treaties:
[U]nder the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the
laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same
manner-whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen
States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent
56
An early draft of article III from the Committee on Detail (in
James Wilson's handwriting) expressly extended jurisdiction to cases
"which may arise . . . on the Law of Nations.' 57 For reasons that are
not articulated in the debates, the final version of that section did not
include a specific reference to the law of nations, but rather parceled
matters dealing with the law of nations into the separate categories of
jurisdiction now appearing in article III. Hamilton explained in The
Federalist No. 80 that the clauses concerning the law of nations were
the various diversity grants, the one dealing with foreign ambassadors
and ministers, the provision for cases arising under treaties, and the
grant for admiralty and maritime cases . 5 Although Hamilton's arrange-
ment covered every aspect of the law of nations that the Framers had
designated as critical to national affairs, he never explicitly stated that
article III encompassed the law of nations in its entirety. Moreover,
Hamilton did not assert that the law of nations fell under article III's
jurisdiction over cases arising under the "laws of the United States."
Professor Arthur Weisburd has argued that the Framers' failure to
list the law of nations as a separate category, combined with Hamilton's
apparently excluding it from the "laws of the United States" in article
III, indicates that the law of nations was not understood as part of the
"laws of the United States. '59 This line of analysis is bolstered with a
point appearing some years later in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
55. Letter from George Mason to Arthur Lee (May 21, 1787), reprinted in 3 M. Farrand,
supra note 25, at 24.
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 46, at 15 (J. Jay).
57. 2 M. Farrand, supra note 25, at 157 (emphasis in original).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 46, at 534-41 (A. Hamilton). A similar categorization
was made by James Wilson. See 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 11, at 281-82.
59. See Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1222-23.
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in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that article III's categories of ju-
risdiction were "distinct," so that a case within the subject matter con-
tained in the grant of jurisdiction under one category could not be
brought into federal court via another.6 0
While this argument may seem plausible at first glance, there is
another construction of article III that better reflects the Framers' ex-
pressed concerns and the jurisprudential perspective of their time. Ini-
tially, it bears stressing that the configuration of article III gave the
federal courts potential jurisdiction over every type of judicially cogni-
zable case involving the law of nations that the Framers thought needed
treatment by the federal judiciary. Both Hamilton and Jay in their re-
spective Federalist papers advanced this viewpoint, and it is consistent
with the Framers' underlying concern for national dominance over key
aspects of the law of nations." Consequently, for the purpose of article
III it was irrelevant to those who wrote the Constitution whether the
"laws of the United States" included the law of nations.
Marshall's argument, made forty years after the Philadelphia Con-
vention in a quite different context, is itself unpersuasive. The jurisdic-
tional classifications in article III overlap substantially. "Issue"
jurisdiction and "citizenship" jurisdiction are not logically distinct.
That is, many admiralty cases, most disputes involving foreign ambas-
sadors and ministers, as well as numerous cases placed in the several
"arising under" categories would also be covered by alienage or diver-
sity jurisdiction. Federal criminal cases both arise under the laws of the
United States and involve the United States as a party. Admiralty itself
included a criminal jurisdiction in which the United States would be a
party.
Several considerations offer a likely explanation for why the Fram-
ers decided not to include a specific reference to the law of nations in
article III. Hamilton's account in The Federalist No. 80 provides part
of the answer. When discussing cases relating "to the intercourse be-
tween the United States and foreign nations," Hamilton noted that
mistreatment of foreign powers or their citizens by a state was "classed
among the just causes of war. '6 2 Foreigners were just as likely to be
affronted by state abuses of local laws as they would from violations of
the law of nations. Hence "it [was] by far most safe and most expedient
60. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828); see Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1215.
61. See Sprout, supra note 3, at 281-82.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 46, at 536 (A. Hamilton). Those who attach much
significance to the Framers' excision of "law of nations" from the draft article III also must explain
the significance of the Framers' substitution of "laws of the United States" for "laws passed by the
legislature," which arguably was intended to incorporate common-law decisions. See Jay, supra
note 8. at 1255.
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to refer all those [cases] in which they [were] concerned to the national
tribunals." 63 Merely creating an article III category for the law of na-
tions would not have reached all the cases involving foreigners that
might present difficulties for the country if handled by state courts.6
Apart from Hamilton's interpretation, a specific inclusion of the
law of nations in article III would have gone beyond the Framers' pur-
pose of extending federal judicial competence to every case involving
national interests. For example, the law of nations included the law
merchant; issues under that body of commercial law would appear not
only in diversity cases, but also in purely intrastate disputes. It would
have been highly controversial for the Framers to recommend that ordi-
nary contract cases involving citizens of the same state be sent to fed-
eral courts. Paralleling this problem was the imprecision known to exist
in some areas of the law of nations, which may have caused the Framers
to distrust using it as a basis of jurisdiction. 5
Even though article III did not mention the law of nations, the ju-
risprudential assumptions and choice of law rules of the day would di-
rect federal courts to decide cases under that law whenever it provided
the relevant rule of decision. The law of nations was classified as "gen-
eral law" in the sense that Swift v. Tyson66 later employed the term.
Questions under the law of nations would be resolved by turning to a
source of law that in theory was recognized throughout the Western
world. For these purposes it usually would not have been appropriate to
employ either the term "United States" or "federal" in conjunction
with a reference to the law of nations. Courts and others seeking to
apply the law of nations assumed without hesitation that they were re-
ferring to an objectively identifiable body of law, and they made use of
the standard treatises and other authorities for explicating the doctrine.
Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act 67 is consistent with this interpreta-
tion, because state law would not apply in a case covered by the law of
nations. 8
The status of the law of nations as general law also explains the
omission of it and any other type of common law from the supremacy
clause, which provides that laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitu-
tion "shall be the supreme law of the land."6 9 Some commentators have
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 46, at 536 (A. Hamilton).
64. Either removal from state courts or exclusive federal jurisdiction would avoid state judi-
cial interference with any case Congress wished to place under federal control.
65. See supra text accompanying note 52.
66. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
67. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982)).
68. See Fletcher, supra note 8; Jay, supra note 8, at 1263-67.
69. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
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contended that the law of nations was "made" by the national govern-
ment and hence it is covered by the supremacy clause, 70 but this con-
clusion contradicts the prepositivist understanding that judges merely
discovered law (a point of view especially important with regard to the
law of nations in that it was formed from international sources).71 It is
similarly inaccurate from an eighteenth-century perspective to depict
the binding effect of the law of nations as springing from its "federal"
character.72 Instead, the force of the law of nations stemmed from the
conception that it was rooted in natural law. To the extent that uni-
formity in interpretation of the law of nations was needed, article III's
jurisdictional grants assured that a federal court (and ultimately the
Supreme Court) would have cognizance over any question of a judicial
nature that the Framers believed needed consistent exposition.
If the reasoning offered here is accurate, what sense should we
make of the previously noted allusions to the law of nations as "the law
of the land"? One explanation is that these expressions were reflections
of the prepositivist understanding that, in appropriate situations, the
"general" law (of which the law of nations was a part) prevailed, and
thus the country was bound by it. Another answer is that these refer-
ences were made in a special context, namely to explain that the inter-
national community considered the United States bound by the law of
nations, and that violations on the part of this country could give just
cause for war by an offended foreign state. Further, as a later section of
this Essay develops, the concern for foreign policy ramifications in mat-
ters involving the law of nations had consequences for separation of
powers questions. Often the assertion that the law of nations was part
of the law of the United States was interjected into situations in which
either the executive or the courts were attempting to justify their asser-
tions of authority.
B. Separation of Powers and the Law of Nations
The Framers must have been aware, as was any knowledgeable per-
son of their day, that violations of the law of nations were common
throughout the world. Consequently, some commentators argue that the
Framers contemplated the possibility that some branch of the national
government would take action in conflict with the prevailing law of na-
tions.7 3 While this may seem reasonable to a modern observer, it is hard
70. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 3, at 343 (noting that "judges also 'make' law, a power
implied in jurisdictional grants").
71. See Jay, supra note 8, at 1275.
72. See Lobel, supra note 4, at 1093.
73. Professor Louis Henkin, for example, writes:
For every State has the power-I do not say the legal right-to denounce or breach its trea-
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to imagine how or why the Framers might have resolved a putative
question of who in the government could violate the law of nations
since the dogma was that no one could. Yet, even under a theory that
afforded obligatory force to the law of nations, there remained the ques-
tion of which branch of government would be responsible for interpret-
ing the country's international obligations. In addition, the possibility
that the political branches might transgress international law left the
issue of whether the Constitution established judicial review for such
violations.
There is no reason to suppose that only one branch of the federal
government was responsible for interpreting the law of nations. As is
true with the separation of powers generally, a given topic might be
assigned exclusively to a branch, or responsibility for it could be shared
with the others. Unfortunately, no provision of the Constitution conclu-
sively resolves any question about the extent of powers given by the
Constitution to Congress or the executive over matters touching on the
law of nations. Certainly nothing in our previous discussion of article
III's heads of federal judicial jurisdiction is helpful for this purpose.
The Constitution fails to delineate which cases involving alleged viola-
tions of the law of nations by the United States would be subject to
judicial review. Indeed, the Constitution does not expressly provide that
the federal courts have a role in constraining the other branches from
violations of international law.
A reasonable assumption is that the Framers expected the Presi-
dent to execute the law of nations in any area within executive compe-
tence. This authority would not encompass all questions concerning the
law of nations. Congress would consider those law of nations issues
within its ambit, such as the definition of offenses against the law of
nations74 and the determination of when the law of nations justified war
(although the latter was not a result free of controversy). The judiciary
would be responsible for a number of other issues under the law of na-
tions, such as admiralty disputes or questions governed by the law
ties, or to violate obligations of customary international law. The Constitution does not allude
to such power, but it is inconceivable that the Constitution was intended to make it impossi-
ble or impermissible-unconstitutional-for the United States to violate a treaty or other
international obligation.
Henkin, supra note 1, at 1568.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Professor Michael Glennon has argued that this clause
precludes the President from violating customary international law without congressional direction
(presumably because that would be an "offense"). Glennon, supra note 3, at 68. But the term
"offense" in the setting of the law of nations had a limited meaning to lawyers of the eighteenth
century. Blackstone listed the principal offenses against the law of nations as violations of safe-
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
6, at 68.
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merchant. Given the overall theory that the law of nations had binding
effect on the nation, it would follow that the President could not disre-
gard the law of nations, but instead had a duty to ensure that the coun-
try complied with it on matters within the executive's province.75 Not
only does this view make sense, but as the next section develops, it was
stated on a number of occasions in the 1790s. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the Constitution gave federal courts authority to
order compliance with international law by the executive.
It cannot be concluded that the Framers intended the federal
courts to have competence over an issue merely because it potentially
fit under one of the categories of article III. For one thing, the judicial
enforcement of rights was confined to claims fitting under common-law
categories dealing with property and contract. 6 Based on English expe-
rience, the Framers expected that matters such as prize cases and diplo-
matic privileges would be treated by courts,77 even though these often
had sensitive foreign policy implications. Questions concerning the for-
mulation and execution of treaties were not ordinarily heard by British
courts, and there is a fair amount of evidence that early Americans
would have regarded many issues relating to treaties as nonjusticiable
political questions.7 s As Blackstone wrote, offenses against the law of
nations were
principally incident to whole states or nations: in which case recourse can only be
had to war; which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such infractions of
public faith, as are committed by one independent people against another: neither
state having any superior jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice29
Blackstone did add that countries had an obligation to restrain
75. Professor Arthur Weisburd has argued that the President is not bound by the domestic
law of the United States to obey customary international law. He maintains that the Framers did
not intend the law of nations to be a "law of the United States" for article III purposes, and
therefore international law should not be included among the laws the President "shall take Care
[to] faithfully execute[]." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3; see Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1209; see also text
accompanying notes 59-60. Weisburd points out that "laws" cannot mean all laws because many
are certainly outside of the President's responsibility, and he suggests that the qualifier "of the
United States" should be read into the take care clause. The Framers, however, rejected such a
recommendation; earlier drafts of the clause specifically incorporated this phrase. See Glennon,
supra note 3, at 334. In any event, Weisburd asserts without proof that the Framers intended to
limit the President's duty to the execution of those laws enumerated in article IlI.
76. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 505-13 (1965).
77. See Dickinson, Law of Nations, supra note 3, at 32.
78. See id.; Lobel, supra note 4, at 1122 n.263, 1127 n.283. Undoubtedly it was expected that
treaties could affect private rights, and thus be the subject of judicial interpretation. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), was an example of this.
79. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 68. This same point was made by Justice Iredell in a
previously noted grand jury charge, in which he remarked that "in whatever manner the Law of
Nations is violated, it is a subject of national, not personal complaint." South Carolina Charge,
supra note 7, in U.S. GAz mrE, supra note 7.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
their citizens from violating the law of nations and hence giving cause
for war. This theory would be used by federal authorities in the 1790s
to justify prosecutions of Americans who acted contrary to the coun-
try's position of neutrality in the ongoing French-American conflict.80 It
might be argued that this theory could require executive officers or
members of Congress to act or refrain from acting in accordance with
international law, but that is at best speculative. In any event, the rem-
edies available in federal courts for official violations of law had specific
requirements, and it would have been at least controversial to propose
that something such as a mandamus action be used to compel the Pres-
ident to obey the law of nations. Some commentators have maintained
recently that Marbury v. Madison81 is authority for the courts to act
against the executive in this way.8 2 Perhaps so, but it is one thing to
demand that the Secretary of State perform a ministerial duty by deliv-
ering a judicial commission (which Marbury defined as a clear property
right), and quite another to order the President to abide by some aspect
of the law of nations. Moreover, the modern acceptance of Marbury's
command that no one is above the laws (an ambivalent acceptance
given the political question doctrine) overlooks the strong outcry at the
time over the mere issuance of process against the executive, much less
the purported authority to issue a writ of mandamus." Marshall's as-
sertion of the mandamus power was more adroit than definitive consid-
ering the Court's determination that it had no jurisdiction to enforce
the remedy.
Notwithstanding ambiguity about the role of judicial review over
questions concerning the law of nations, modern commentators argue
over whether the Framers intended the federal courts to "have the last
word" on international law issues. 4 These observations import a posi-
tivist notion of judicial review and interpretive hegemony that does not
square well with concepts of law and the judicial function in the late
eighteenth century. For many of the issues dealing with the law of na-
tions, the federal courts had final authority for the simple reason that
no other governmental body was competent to interfere. By the same
token, the judiciary did not interfere with decisions respecting the law
of nations that fell within the executive's exclusive domain. But no na-
80. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 68; see Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Wilson, J.) (Charge to the Grand Jury) (stating that if the nation refuses to
oblige its citizen to make reparation or punish for the offense against the law of nations, "it ren-
ders itself in some measure an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes responsible for the injury").
81. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
82. See Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 927 (1986).
83. See Bloch & Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison,
1986 Wis. L. R.v. 301, 319 n.70; Jay, supra note 32, at 1107-10.
84. Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1241.
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tional agency had "the last word" on these issues: it lay under the ulti-
mate control of the international community. Having said this, the
question is still unresolved whether the Constitution provided any in-
stances of overlapping authority, in which the courts would have been
able to disagree with another branch of government or to order that
branch to comply with the law of nations.
III. THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
American public affairs in the late eighteenth century were closely
linked with international affairs in numerous respects. The continuing
hostilities between Great Britain and France, which intensified with the
events of the French Revolution, dominated the issues of foreign policy.
From the standpoint of the Washington and Adams Administrations,
the problem was maintaining neutrality in the face of both strong pub-
lic feelings favoring the French and transgressions by each of these for-
eign powers on American shipping. Adding to the stress was the fact
that the United States was hemmed in on the North American conti-
nent by the Spanish and the British, with the latter still maintaining
military outposts on American territory. The United States was in no
position to conduct any serious military or naval operations, it had a
sizeable debt from the Revolutionary War to repay, and there was no
assurance that the citizenry would unite if the Administration commit-
ted forces. At the same time, many Americans refused to pay private
pre-war debts to British merchants, further exacerbating British ire. A
considerable number of American citizens covertly or overtly intrigued
with the Spanish or the British. It was impossible to avoid the problems
in Europe because American commerce depended on access to overseas
markets. Moreover, any conflict between the British and the Spanish
likely would include hostilities along the ill-defined borders of the west-
ern territories and might pull the United States into the contest.8 5 The
United States also had obligations to France under the treaties of 1778,
including a pledge to guarantee its ally's possessions in the West
Indies. 6
85. Numerous sources discuss these events. See, e.g., J. BOYD, NUMBER 7: ALEXANDER HAMm-
TON'S SECRET ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1964); A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING
ALLIANCE (1958); A. DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR (1966); J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE
NEW NATION (1970); J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREWELL (1969); F. GILBERT,
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS (1965); D. LANG, FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1985); G. LYCAN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY (1970); D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY (1962); F. McDONALD, THE
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (1975); C. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793 (1967).
86. See M. SMELSER, THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE 226-28 (1972).
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Foreign affairs had critical ramifications for domestic policies. A
major rationale for Hamilton's controversial economic plans was to en-
courage the growth of a substantial manufacturing sector in order to
avoid dependence on foreign countries and to make it less likely that
the United States would be drawn into conflicts. Domestic manufactur-
ing would also provide a stable source of armaments. Hamilton's insis-
tence on increased military appropriations, which required additional
revenues, was inspired by the need to place the country in a position to
act more freely in the international arena.87 Often these measures
prompted vehement criticism from the emerging opposition party, and
eventually led the Adams Administration to pursue extraordinary mea-
sures, including sedition prosecutions. All these events were connected
to the evolution of the Republican party and the political fortunes of
Thomas Jefferson.88
As Washington and Adams found themselves required to react to
foreign events and to shape a coherent policy toward Europe, the need
arose to delineate the respective powers of the President and the Con-
gress. Although the Framers arguably intended the President to be
"more than an agent of Congress""9 in external relations, the Constitu-
tion was not generous in its depiction of the executive's role. If any-
thing, the commitment to Congress of the war powers, the regulation of
foreign commerce, and the definition of offenses against the law of na-
tions, taken together with the treaty ratification power in the Senate,
supported a strong role for the legislative branch in foreign relations. In
contrast, the Constitution specifically commands the President to "exe-
cute" the laws (as opposed to make them), which reasonably supports
the assumption of a relatively modest spot for the executive.90 Ameri-
cans of the late eighteenth century would have approached this issue
with a deep-seated ideological distrust of the types of prerogative pow-
ers in foreign affairs that were associated with European monarchs and
a solid fear of a standing army.9 '
87. See D. LANG, supra note 85, at 21.
88. See L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 246-47
(1978).
89. W. REVELEY, supra note 51, at 99.
90. Writing as Helvidius, Madison said that "[t]he natural province of the executive magis-
trate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make laws. All his acts, therefore, properly
executive, must presuppose the existence of laws to be executed." Madison, Helvidius No. I, in
LarrsRs, supra note 35, at 57. The Constitution used the word "make" to describe the President's
role with respect to treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
91. See F. MARKS, supra note 26, at 144. In the Helvidius papers, Madison wrote: "The
power of making treaties and the power of declaring war, are royal prerogatives in the British
government, and accordingly treated as executive prerogatives by British commentators."
Madison, Helvidius No. I, in LETTERS, supra note 35, at 62 (emphasis in original). The fourth
Helvidius essay contains a passionate warning that "[w]ar is in fact the true nurse of executive
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A recurring topic at Cabinet meetings in this period was whether
Congress should be involved in a particular matter. Cabinet meetings
and memoranda to the President from the Cabinet officers also involved
detailed discussions of issues concerning the law of nations. These com-
munications were replete with citations to the leading treatises of the
day on this subject. Disagreements over interpretation of these sources
were common among Cabinet members and an advocate's viewpoint
about a passage from Vattel or another luminary bore a relationship to
that officer's policy position. We can hardly imagine this type of ex-
change occurring among the protagonists in a modern American Cabi-
net meeting. Perhaps this portrayal gives the impression that political
figures of the eighteenth century were more serious in their commit-
ment to follow international norms. To whatever extent that is true, it
is overshadowed entirely by the context in which these discussions
about foreign relations were held.
A. American Weakness and the Law of Nations
The primary consideration that forced the United States to pay re-
spect to the law of nations was the country's weakness in relation to the
European powers. As Edwin Dickinson has written about the eight-
eenth century, "It was an age of the basest diplomatic intrigue, of hos-
tilities too rarely assuaged in periods of peace, and of the utmost
ruthlessness in the conduct of hostilities."9 Throughout the eighteenth
century, wars fought on American territory were tied directly to the
balance of power in Europe. Even the Revolution owed its successful
outcome in large measure to the interplay of powers in Europe; the
French had aided the war effort principally to further their own ambi-
tions.9 Those forming the national government sought to avoid the Eu-
ropean power struggle and the permanent military establishment that
went along with playing politics by warfare."' Entangling military alli-
ances were to be shunned. The Framers, in fact, expected only occa-
sional need for diplomacy and treaties, and these would be mostly
commercial in nature.95
American determination to evolve as a commercial power unaf-
fected by the ills of continental affairs was squarely supported by Vat-
tel's theory of sovereign equality. Vattel maintained that nations were
equal in their rights and obligations under the law of nations because
aggrandizement." Id. at 89.
92. Dickinson, Changing Concepts, supra note 3, at 241.
93. See D. LANG, supra note 85, at 68-71; M. SMELSER, supra note 86, at 222-24.
94. See Lint, The American Revolution and the Law of Nations, 1 DriPL. HIST. 20, 21 (1977).
95. See F. MARKS, supra note 26, at 155; W. REVELRY, supra note 51, at 61.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
they were comprised of people who were naturally equal themselves: "A
dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small Republic is no less a sover-
eign state than the most powerful kingdom." 98 During the Continental
Congress in 1775, Benjamin Franklin wrote to thank the American
agent in The Hague for copies of Vattel's treatise, which he said the
delegates had been using continually-"the circumstances of a rising
State make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations. 9 7
At the practical level, the need to avoid a violation that would give
a more powerful country cause for war explained the insistence on fol-
lowing the law of nations. During the period of the Articles of Confeder-
ation, a desire to avoid war inspired concern about states' disregard of
the law of nations.98 An early instance of this occurred at the beginning
of the Washington Administration in 1790, when Great Britain came
close to war with Spain (then France's ally) following a clash on Nootka
Sound in the Pacific Northwest. Before the affair defused, Washington
alerted his Cabinet to the probability of war, which likely would have
produced a request from the British to move forces from Canada across
American territory to attack New Orleans. The President asked his
Cabinet and Chief Justice Jay to advise him on the proper response.
Each responded in writing (Jay included), and their memoranda con-
tain abundant references to the law of nations, along with elaborate in-
terpretive arguments about various treatise writers' views on the
subjects.99
In the Nootka Sound opinions, the contentions about the law of
nations (writers differed on the obligations under it) were interspersed
with assessments of the strategic consequences of various courses of
conduct. These legal commentaries, in short, were designed to show
whether particular options would give another power a basis to declare
war. The writers held no illusions that the British would behave in ac-
cordance with the law of nations, or that moral considerations alone
should motivate American conduct. Moreover, the opinions reflected
each writer's position about the British. Hamilton, for example, con-
tended strongly that our interests were on the side of cooperation with
them, a view that was consistent with his basic Anglophilia. Jefferson,
by contrast, feared danger to the United States if Britain gained Flor-
ida and Louisiana; he wanted to remain neutral, but not in a way that
would seem partial to the British.100
96. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 11, at lxii.
97. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles Dumas (Dec. 1775), reprinted in 2 THE REvo-
LUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (F. Wharton ed. 1889).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
99. The opinions are collected in J. BOYD, supra note 85, at 107-39.
100. See D. LANG, supra note 85, at 94-96, 130-31.
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Complicating America's general desire to stay neutral in the 1790s
were the earlier treaties with France, because they arguably obligated
the United States to render assistance to that country in its conflict
with Great Britain. Aiding the French would have comported well with
the high favor that many Americans held for the French on account of
their contributions to the Revolution. But such open assistance would
have meant war with the British. Consequently, within the Administra-
tion even those most favorable to France were averse to taking steps
that might result in hostilities.
Hamilton, who saw his country's interests best served by a close
relationship with Britain, sought to minimize America's responsibilities
under the French treaties. Yet as he confided to Jay, it was doubtful
whether the United States "could bona fide dispute the ultimate obliga-
tions of the treaty."'01 Nonetheless, Hamilton did dispute them, both in
the Cabinet and in public writing as Pacificus and Camillus. He argued
that the treaties should be considered suspended because of the over-
throw of Louis XVI or at least narrowly interpreted to exclude assis-
tance, since the treaties were defensive in nature and the French were
engaged in an offensive war.10 Just as Hamilton defended his position
with references to the law of nations, so too did Jefferson in reply. Jef-
ferson maintained that the United States was obliged under the law of
nations, which he said was the applicable law, to honor its treaty com-
mitments with France. He also argued at length that acting in accor-
dance with the treaty commitments did not endanger American
interests, a position which agreed with his overall sympathies toward
with the French.10 3 Besides, Jefferson concluded, repudiating the trea-
ties would be "giving just cause of war to France."' 04
Despite Washington's decision not to repudiate the treaty formally
and instead to proclaim American neutrality, the French were not satis-
fied. America was most valuable to the French as a neutral and thus as
a source of supplies, yet they also desired access to bases in the United
States for the purpose of outfitting privateers to cruise against British
101. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 PAPERS OF A. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 33, at 297-98.
102. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2,
1793), in 14 PAPERS OF A- HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 367-96; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 398-408; A.
HAMILTON, Pacificus No. II, in 15 PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 55-63.
103. See T. JEFFERSON, Opinion on French Treaties (Apr. 28, 1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 283-301 (P. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter WORKS OF T. JEFFERSON]. Jefferson
complained to Madison that Hamilton's argument was based on "an ill understood scrap in Vat-
tel." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 28, 1793), in id. at 301. See generally
D. MALONE, supra note 85, at 73-79.
104. T. JEFFERSON, Opinion on French Treaties, supra note 103, in 7 WORKS OF T. JEFFER-
SON, supra note 103, at 301.
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ships. In addition, France wished to recruit Americans for service in its
military and naval operations. While France insisted that the 1778 trea-
ties gave them these rights, American leaders understood that this
course of conduct would risk confrontation with the British. The Wash-
ington Administration not only refused the French requests, but an-
nounced that Americans serving on French privateers or otherwise
endangering neutrality would be prosecuted for violations of the law of
nations.105
The series of incidents over neutrality and the French treaties pro-
vided the context for several important discussions about the status of
the law of nations under American law and the powers of the respective
branches of the federal government in relation to international law. One
was Jefferson's statement to the French ambassador, Edmond C. Gen~t,
who was protesting that the Washington Administration's neutrality
posture violated the standing treaties with France. Gen~t suggested
that Congress should decide this matter; this prompted Jefferson to re-
spond "that the President is to see that treaties are observed ...
[T]he constitution ha[s] made the President the last appeal." 108
Of more significance was the Administration's threatened and ac-
tual prosecutions of Americans for neutrality violations. Every leading
official in the Washington Administration, including Jefferson, asserted
that it was unlawful for American citizens to act contrary to their coun-
try's obligations under the law of nations. This setting produced a con-
siderable number of statements, many of which were noted earlier, that
the law of nations was part of the law of the United States. A large
portion of these pronouncements appeared in grand jury charges by
federal judges who were urging vigilance in prosecuting neutrality viola-
tions. Without these judicial declarations the government would have
been hard pressed to explain the basis of the prosecutions, given that
no statute existed on neutrality offenses. 07 In the Administration's first
prosecution, Henfield's Case,10° Justice Wilson responded to the de-
fense's objection that no law had been violated by holding that the of-
fense was against "the law of nations; not an ex post facto law, but a
law that was in existence long before Gideon Henfield existed."10 9 The
105. See A. DECoNDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE, supra note 85, at 205-34.
106. This was recorded in notes made by Jefferson of the conversation on July 10, 1793. See
1 WORKS OF T. JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 285.
107. See Jay, supra note 32, at 1042-53. All the grand jury charges noted earlier in the text
were made in this context.
108. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
109. Id. at 1120. This concern for the existence of a law defining the offense probably under-
lies Justice Iredell's remark to a grand jury a few months earlier that the law of nations had been
stated by treatise writers "with peculiar accuracy and conciseness." South Carolina Charge, supra
note 7, in U.S. GAZETTE, supra note 7; see also supra text accompanying note 17. Iredell was one of
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jury acquitted Henfield, a result that Hamilton attributed to the jurors'
French bias, but the Administration had achieved its goal of a firm ju-
dicial pronouncement that the neutrality violations were illegal." 0
Henfield's Case did not recede into obscurity; it provided legal au-
thority for other federal common-law criminal prosecutions in the
1790s. While some of these cases involved ordinary crimes such as brib-
ery, the Adams Administration prosecuted Republican dissenters for
the common-law offense of sedition. Virtually every member of the na-
tional judiciary in the 1790s supported the concept of federal common-
law crimes. Republicans, however, proclaimed that the Federalist exec-
utive and judiciary were attempting to assert federal jurisdiction over
the entire common law. Federalists actually were not making such a
broad claim, yet it became an article of political faith to Thomas Jeffer-
son and his followers that the claims for common-law jurisdiction were
part of a plot to absorb all the powers of the states into one national
government."' After Jefferson became President and had secured his
own majority on the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in United States
v. Hudson"2 that the federal courts had jurisdiction only over crimes
created by statutes.
One commentator has maintained that Hudson "obviously weak-
ened the authority of those Framers who contended . . . that the laws
of the United States included the law of nations." 13 But Hudson was a
criminal defamation prosecution, and the Supreme Court majority
wrote the opinion against the backdrop of the Republican claim that
Federalist judges were attempting to absorb the mass of the British
common law into the law of the United States. Thus, the Court's fore-
most concern was the perceived threat of federal common-law jurisdic-
tion to the lawmaking authority of the states. Regardless of the merits
of the Republican position on this issue, it was not focused at the time
the trial judges in Henfield's Case.
110. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1793), in 15 PAPERS
OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 194; Jay, supra note 32, at 1051.
111. See Jay, supra note 8, at 1231-41. Professor Arthur Weisburd has written that "[a]t
least some of the Framers who asserted that the laws of the United States included the law of
nations took that position as an element of their broader belief in the unlimited common-law juris-
diction of the federal courts." Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1222. Curiously, he relies on my article,
Jay, supra note 32, at 1042-52, but that is not a conclusion which I stated. My point was that
Republicans claimed the Federalists were advancing such a position, but that the accusation was
politically motivated and largely unfounded. See id. at 1112. As John Marshall wrote in 1800, not
'one man [could] be found" who maintained "that the common law of England has . . . been
adopted as the common law of America by the constitution of the United States." Letter from
John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in Jay, supra note 8, at app. A.
112. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
113. Weisburd, supra note 3, at 1222-23.
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on the law of nations.1 4 Jefferson's party was not making a case for
state domination over foreign relations. 115 Furthermore, even Jefferson
was fully behind the neutrality prosecutions.
The neutrality cases show that the use of the law of nations as the
domestic law of the United States was related directly to the need for
control over a critical foreign policy issue. This conclusion demon-
strates, moreover, that a sizeable portion of early pronouncements
about the application of the law of nations to American law must be
understood as having been advanced to augment the executive's asser-
tion of power over foreign affairs. To be sure, the law of nations was
said to limit American actions, but this was in the context of con-
straints imposed by the threat of war, not by judicial review of execu-
tive actions. If anything, the evidence indicates close cooperation
between the federal courts and the executive in maintaining the Admin-
istration's neutrality position. 16 The various statements in the neutral-
114. In United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816), the Court held that a com-
mon-law indictment could not lie for an offense within the admiralty law. Justice Story had sat in
the circuit court that convicted Coolidge for forcibly rescuing a vessel that had been seized lawfully
as a prize by privateers. Story distinguished Hudson on the ground that the Coolidge prosecution
was under the admiralty jurisdiction, see 25 F. Cas. 619, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), but
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction on authority of Hudson. See Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 415. Given that admiralty cases fell under the law of nations, Coolidge might seem to
offer better support than Hudson for a denial of inherent judicial authority over the law of nations.
However, the Supreme Court held no argument in Coolidge because neither side appeared. The
Court acknowledged a continuing "difference of opinion" among the Justices on the question of
common-law jurisdiction, but considering the absence of counsel it decided to follow Hudson. Id.
No mention was made of the law of nations or Story's argument at trial that admiralty courts had
long possessed a nonstatutory criminal jurisdiction. See Jay, supra note 8, at 1298-99.
115. In 1802 Jefferson's Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, wrote that there was no federal
crime violated in a case in which the Spanish ambassador complained of a riotous assault against
him. Citing Vattel, Lincoln wrote that the alleged actions constituted a violation of the law of
nations, which was "part of the municipal body of each State." 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 691, 692 (1802).
Thus the case should have been referred to state authorities. Lincoln stated: "I doubt the compe-
tency of the federal courts, there being no statute recognizing the offence." Id. Because this state-
ment was made shortly after the heated debates in Congress over nonstatutory federal offenses,
Lincoln's reserve is understandable, albeit completely in contradiction to earlier opinions by Fed-
eralist Attorneys General. See Jay, supra note 32, at 1073-1111. Lincoln did not deny, however, the
possibility of Congress passing a statute on the subject.
116. At the height of the crisis, Washington submitted questions to the Justices about the
proper interpretation of the law of nations in regard to American neutrality. The Justices returned
the questions unanswered on the ground that no "case" was involved, even though Chief Justice
Jay gave such advice during the Nootka Sound affair. See supra text accompanying note 99. The
incident of the returned letter may involve more than judicial restraint. For one thing, Justice
Wilson addressed many of the questions in a grand jury charge that he delivered before the Chief
Justice formally declined to answer. See Jay, supra note 32, at 1049. More importantly, Hamilton
had written as Pacificus only weeks earlier that the interpretation of treaties is an executive func-
tion, "foreign to the Judiciary Department," which reviewed treaties "only in litigated cases." A.
HAMILTON, Pacificus No. I, in 15 PAPERs OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 38. Hamilton's argu-
ment was used to justify the Administration's claim of authority to judge American obligations
under the French treaties.
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ity period regarding the binding character of the law of nations should
be seen as part of an effort by the American government to impose the
law of nations on its subjects in order to achieve a national objective.117
B. The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power
When the United States was formed, American leaders sought to
avoid the European political turmoil. By the 1790s, however, the coun-
try was thoroughly engaged in the international balance of power.
Keeping an eye on the law of nations was part of the game. As one
diplomatic historian has noted about the effect of the balance of power
on international law: "National governments make international law
and enforce it as far as they are able, which implies that strong nations
make international law." 11 8 In this vein, the Administration's neutrality
posture acknowledged international reality, and "the law of nations per-
taining to trade and neutral rights largely reflected British dominance
of the seas." 1 9 American reliance on the law of nations, then, was in
deference to the very balance of power system that the Framers wished
to avoid.120
At the same time, many Americans realized that the United States
could gain some advantage from European conflict, and an ability to
insist on sovereign rights was important to that end. Examples of this
attitude are Madison's plans to employ discriminatory trade practices
against the British as a means of gaining bargaining strength, and Jef-
ferson's advice in the Nootka Sound affair to exercise American rights
so as to extract concessions from the Spanish. One of the reasons Vattel
seemed a compelling authority was his emphasis on the necessity of
obeying international law out of duty, rather than interest. Under this
theory, a great power could not abuse American sovereign rights in pur-
suit of short-term gain.121
Despite the prominent references by eighteenth-century treatise
writers and jurists to the natural law origins of the law of nations,
Americans did not always depict it as a static body of rules. Neither did
Americans feel compelled to follow slavishly the interpretation of the
law of nations set down in the treatises. Hamilton, for example, con-
tended that the ability to appeal to the law of nature allowed for disa-
greement with Vattel and other writers about even those aspects of the
117. See Rosen, Alexander Hamilton and the Domestic Uses of International Law, 5 DnPL.
HisT. 183 (1981).
118. Id. at 195.
119. D. LANo, supra note 85, at 128.
120. See Lint, supra note 94, at 33.
121. See D. LANG, supra note 85, at 45, 131.
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law of nations that were considered obligatory on states.' 2 Diplomatic
negotiations from the Revolutionary days onward found Americans con-
sciously attempting to depart from the law of nations-with the intent
to change international custom-on issues dealing with treaty formula-
tions and the rights of neutrals trading in wartime. 23 It was in terms of
newer attitudes about the rights of neutral traders that Jefferson said:
"[T]he general principles of the law of nations, must give the rule. I
mean the principles of that law as they have been liberalized in latter
times by the refinement of manners & morals, and evidenced by the
Declarations, Stipulations, and Practice of every civilized Nation.' '124
The law of nations, then, served American interests even though
the United States was a relatively impotent world player. Further, the
United States endeavored to influence the development of the law of
nations by asserting diplomatic positions that at times were in opposi-
tion to established international law. Often these positions had been
taken in the context of diplomatic negotiations, without congressional
participation. These themes bring us to the final subject of this Essay:
The role of the law of nations in defining executive powers over foreign
affairs.
C. Executive Powers and the Law of Nations
One aspect of the neutrality cases that should not be overlooked is
that Washington's neutrality proclamation in effect created the crimes
charged against Americans. The growing Republican opposition consid-
ered the power to declare neutrality a congressional prerogative, a view
that Jefferson shared even though he supported issuing the proclama-
tion.12 5 The ability to utilize criminal prosecutions in aid of foreign pol-
icy objectives significantly augmented executive power, a fact that did
not go unnoticed in the opposition party.'26 The executive claimed au-
thority to interpret the law of nations as part of the process of gaining
122. See A. HAMILTON, To Defence No. XX, in 19 PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at
330 (H. Syrett ed. 1973).
123. See Lint, supra note 94, at 24-33; Reeves, supra note 15, at 557-61.
124. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (May 7, 1793), in 7 WORKS OF T.
JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 314; see D. LANG, supra note 85, at 144-45.
125. See A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE, supra note 85, at 254-56; D. MALONE, supra
note 85, at 69-73; D. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 145-48 (1969); C.
THOMAS, supra note 85, at 36-37. James Madison, then a member of Congress, wrote Jefferson that
the neutrality proclamation "seems to violate the forms & spirit of the Constitution, by making the
executive Magistrate the organ of the disposition, the duty and the interest of the Nation in rela-
tion to War & peace, subjects appropriated to other department of the Government." Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 10, 1793), reprinted in D. MALONE, supra note 85, at
82.
126. See D. STEWART, supra note 125, at 149-51; see also A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE,
supra note 85, at 215; Jay, supra note 32, at 1052.
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ascendancy over American foreign policy.
Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton contended that "the law of nations
form a part of the law of the land," and that the President was
"charged with the execution of all laws," including the law of nations. 12 7
Similarly, in defending the Jay Treaty, Hamilton said as Camillus that
the country had adopted the law of nations.128 Viewed in isolation,
these contentions seem to offer strong support for the modern view that
the law of nations operates as a legal constraint on the executive.'29 In
each instance, however, Hamilton actually was arguing for the right of
the executive to interpret the law of nations exclusive of the other
branches of government. Hamilton wrote Pacificus No. 1 to defend the
neutrality proclamation:
He who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning. In
order to the observance of that conduct, which the laws of nations combined with
our treaties prescribed for this country . . . it was necessary for the President to
judge for himself whether there was any thing in our treaties incompatible with an
adherence to neutrality. Having judged that there was not, he had a right, and if in
his opinion the interests of the Nation required it, it was his duty, as Executor of
the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of the Nation, to exhort all persons to observe
it, and to warn them of the penalties which would attend its non observance.130
Hamilton continued by remarking that Congress's powers over for-
eign affairs were limited: "They are to be construed strictly-and ought
to be extended no further than is essential to their execution."'' Along
the same lines, Hamilton apparently intended his Camillus argument to
prove that the law of nations compelled the Administration to take cer-
tain positions in the Jay Treaty negotiations. Hamilton was aware, of
course, that the treaty was under heated attack as a surrender to the
British.
The Pacificus papers, which were widely known to be Hamilton's
work, provoked Jefferson to urge a response from Madison, which he
did as Helvidius. Madison produced a brilliant series on the dangers of
war and the perils of executive dominance over foreign affairs. Cer-
tainly, he allowed, it was a "truth" that the executive must execute the
law of nations, but it was a legislative function to determine neutrality
and questions related to treaty obligations. 132 Madison even denied that
the President had the authority to recognize a foreign government. 33
127. A. HAMILTON, Pacificus No. I, in 15 PAPERS OF A- HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 40, 43.
128. See supra text accompanying note 34.
129. See Lobel, supra note 4, at 1116.
130. A. HAMILTON, Pacificus No. I, in 15 PAPERS OF A. HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 43.
131. Id. at 42.
132. See Madison, Helvidius Nos. I & III, in LETrERS, supra note 35, at 64-85. For example,
Madison wrote: "The executive must ... execute the laws of neutrality whilst in force, and leave
it to the legislature to decide, whether they ought to be altered or not." Id. at 73.
133. Id. at 78.
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Madison's chief point, however, was to attack frontally any pretense
that the executive determined when to declare war, for this power was
"fully and exclusively vested in the legislature. 1 3 4
Other illustrations could be added, but this exchange highlights a
central aspect of the law of nations issue in the 1790s. The period com-
menced under a Constitution containing an ill-defined separation of
powers over international relations. Throughout the opening decade of
the new nation, political actors competed in the struggle to influence
America's foreign affairs. In contending for the necessity of following
the law of nations, Hamilton and others were not advancing a theory of
jurisprudence so much as they were attempting to take the lead in for-
mulating United States foreign policy.135
IV. CONCLUSION
At the Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry listened to as-
surances that the law of nations offered binding protection against ex-
ecutive abuses of the treaty power. Unimpressed, Henry retorted:
"When you yourselves have your necks so low that the President may
dispose of your rights as he pleases, the law of nations cannot be ap-
plied to relieve you."'31 6 With a few words he struck at the heart of the
problem of the law of nations in relation to American domestic law. The
obligations of the United States to foreign states and their citizens are
defined principally in the international arena; the extent to which
American law acknowledges the law of nations is largely irrelevant. Do-
mestically, in the context of either a United States citizen or a foreigner
urging American law to follow international doctrines, the issue always
revolves around an initial decision of whether to constrain our own in-
stitutions. This judgment turns on deciding which branch of govern-
ment should have the power to interpret the law of nations, or to depart
from it (perhaps in the expectation that the American position will
eventually become the international custom).
American conceptions of the distribution of power over foreign af-
fairs have evolved as the Nation has developed into a power with sub-
stantial ability to influence foreign events. As the executive acquires
more discretion in foreign policy, concomitantly that same office grows
in its ability to dominate interpretation of and adherence to the law of
nations. From the very first years of the country, the law of nations
often has served more as a source of executive power than as a limita-
tion on it.
134. Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
135. See Rosen, supra note 117, at 197.
136. 3 STATE CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 39, at 503.
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Notwithstanding the fascination we may feel for the events of the
early Republic in regard to international relations, their contextual dif-
ferences from world affairs today should lead us to view the various
statements about the law of nations from that era as having no bearing
on modern controversies. Certainly one can quote out of context, and
scores have done so. And, some may be persuaded that declarations
made by American leaders in a time of relative weakness ought to be
honored when the United States has reached its place in the sun. But
that is a moral judgment reflecting the speaker's commitment to the
enterprise of customary international law.

